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Capture of 
Fort Fisher, 

North Carolina, 
Jan. 15, 1865. 




General Adelbert Ames, 
Late U. S. Army. 



■\ 



THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER, NORTH CAROLINA, 

January 15th, 1865. 



About the first of December, 1864, when in command of the 
2d Division, 24th Corps, of the Army of the James, then before 
Richmond, Va., I was notified I had been selected to lead my 
division in a movement, by sea, against some point of the Con- 
federacy on the Atlantic coast. 

At that time Wilmington, N. C, was the port tlirough 
which the Confederacy received a large part of its munitions of 
war, and whence was shipped to England, in payment therefor, 
much of its cotton and tobacco. Wilmington was situated on 
the east bank of the Cape Fear River, thirty miles from its 
mouth, which was guarded by Fort Fisher. 

Our Navy was untiring in its efforts to blockade that port; 
but was not successful. 

The order from Gen. Butler to Gen. Weitzel relative to the 
expedition December 6th, 1864, was: "Tlie Major General 
conmianding has entrusted you with the command of the expe- 
dition about to embark for the North Carolina coast. It will 
consist of 6,500 infantry, two batteries and fifty cavalry. The 
effective men of Gen. Ames's division of the 24th Corps will 
furnish the infantry force. Gen. Paine is under your orders and 
Gen. Ames will be ordered to report to you in person 
immediately." 

My division, of three brigades, was composed of New Hamp- 
shire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana troops, about 3.300 
in number. Gen. Paine had a division of colored troops. 



We embarked at Bermuda Hundreds, \'a., December Sth, 
and our transports reached the 'place of rendezvous off New 
Inlet, N. C, Thursday, the 15th. Friday, Saturday, and Sanday, 
we awaited the coming of the Navy. 

^duct''of^he Admiral Porter, conuiianding our fleet, arrived Sunday 

f.e'k. pNS' evening, the i8th. The next day the water was too rough to 
make a landing on the ocean beach. Towards evening a north- 
east gale coming up, the transports were sent to Beaufort for 
coal and water, as the ten days' supply had run short, where they 
were delayed by the weather and the difficulty of getting coal, 
until Saturday, the 24th. 

I did not go to Beaufort, as my ship, on which 1 had one of 
my brigades, was well prepared for such an emergency. 

Gen. Butler, followed by his fleet of transports, returned to 
New Inlet on Saturday, the 24th of December, between four and 
five o'clock in the afternoon. 

Ft F. Ex., p. The powder boat, which plaved such a notorious part in 

123 . ^ 

this expedition, had been exploded at about two o'clock on the 
' morning of the same day. 

The idea of the powder boat was Gen. Butler's, but it was 
approved of and adopted by the Navy, which furnished the 
vessel and its share of the 215 tons of gunpowder used. The 
Navy held control of this experiment from first to last. 

^'p^2^.''^'^^" T^^^ explosion was untimely, and a failure. Gommodore 

Jeffers of the Navy reports: "A part of the programme required 
that the vessel shoifld be grounded, which appears not to have 
been the case." 

^p^kFz!'^'^^'' Commander Rhind writes: "That, owing to the want of 

confinement and insufficient fusing of the mass, that nuich of 
the powder was blown away before ignition and its effect lost.'' 
p. 250.' " "' Admiral Porter reports: "That the powder was finally 

exploded from the effects of a fire kindled in the forecastle. No 
results of value were to be expected from this mode. It was 
proposed only as a final resort, in order to prevent the vessel, 
in any contingency, from falling into the hands of the enemy." 



Commander James Parker, U. S. Navy, stated to the New 
York Loyal Legion, Oct. 5. 1892: "We all believed in it (the 
powder boat) from the Admiral down, but when it proved so 
laughable a failure we, of the Navy, laid its paternity upon 
General Butler." 

Col. Land), in command, describes Fort Fisher as follows: 
■"At the land face of Fort Fisher the peninsula was about half a 
mile wide. Cape Fear River being on one side and the Atlantic 
Ocean on the other. This face commenced about a hundred 
feet from the river with a h.alf bastion, and extended with a 
heavy curtain to a full bastion on the ocean side, where it joined 
the sea-face. The work was built to withstand the heaviest artil- 
lery fire. The outer slope was twenty feet high from the berm 
to the top of the parapet, at an angle of 45 degrees, and was 
sodded with marsh grass, which grew luxuriantly. The parapet 
-vvas not less than 25 feet thick, with an inclination of only one 
foot. The revetment was five feet nine inches high, from the 
floor of the gun chambers, and these were some twelve feet or 
more from the interior plane. The guns were all mounted in 
barbette, Columbiad carriages; there was not a single casemated 
gun in the fort. Between the gun chambers, containing one or 
two guns each (there were twenty heavy guns on the land face), 
there were" (some 18) "heavy traverses, exceeding in size any 
known to engineers, to protect from an enfilading fire. They ex- 
tended v^ut some twelve feet on the parapet, running back thirty 
feet or more. The gun chambers were reached from the rear by 
steps. In each traverse was an alternate magazine o? bomb- 
proof, the latter ventilated by an air-chamber. Passageways 
penetrated the traverses in the interior of the work, forming 
additional bomb-proofs for the reliefs of the guns. 

"The sea-face was a mile long, and for a hundred yards from 
the northeast bastion was of the same massive character as the 
land face. 

"As a defence against infantry there was a system of sub- 
terre torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to six hun- 
dred feet from the land face and so disconnected that an 

3 



Century War 
Books, vol. 4, 
p. 641. 



Century W ;i r 
Books. 



Century W a r 
Books. 



explosion of one would not affect the others; inside the torpe- 
does, about 50 feet from the berni of the work, extending from 
the river bank to the seashore, was a heavy palisade of sharpened 
logs nine feet high, pierced for musketry, and so laid out as to 
have an enfilading fire on the centre, where there was a redoubt 
guarding a sally-port from which two Napoleons were run out 
as occasion required. At the river end of the palisade was a 
deep and muddy slough, across which was a bridge, the entrance 
on the river road into the fort; commanding this bridge was a 
Napoleon gun. There were three mortars in rear of the land 
face." 

• 

This strong work had, at the time of our first expedition, a 
garrison of 1400 men, 900 'of wdiom were veterans. 

Col. Lamb had been incited to the utmost by Gen. Lee, who 
had sent him word that he "must hold the fort or he could not 
subsist his army." 

On the morning of the 24th the fleet of Admiral Porter 
moved in towards New Inlet and opened fire on the fort. The 
character of this bombardment and the demands made by the 
Admiral on his ships and sailors I will let him tell. 

In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of the 24th of 
December, 1864, he says: "I have the honor to inform you that 
I attacked the forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear River today 
at 12.30. * * * * After getting the ships in po.sition we 
silenced it in about an hour and a half, there being no troops 
here to take possession. I am merely firing now to keep up 
practice. The forts are nearly demolished, and as soon as troops 
come we can take possession. We have set them on fire, blown 
some of them up, and all that is wanted now is troops to land 
^p^il^!'^'^^' ^"d go into them." The Admiral failed to mention, in his letter, 
the fact that I had offered 1,000 men and co-operation, although,, 
in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, he said: "Gen. Ames had a thousand men there, and he 
sent on board and told me he was ready to land." 

In his letter of the 26th he says, referring to the bombard- 
ment of the 24th: "In an hour and fifteen minutes after the 

4 



C.W. Ft.F.Ex. 
p. 97. 



first shot was fired not a shot came from the fort. Finding c.w.fi.f.ex. 

p. 123-4. 

that the batteries were silenced completely I directed the ships 

to keep up a moderate fire in hopes of attracting the attention 

of the transports and bringing them in.'' In this same letter of c.w. Ft.F.Ex., 

December 26th Admiral Porter says, speaking of the bom- ^'- '~'^' 

bardment of the forts on December 25th: "The firing this day 

was slow, only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the army 

landed. In the bombardment of the 25th the men were engaged c.w. Ft.p.Ex.. 

firing slowly for seven hours. * * * Everything was coolly ^^' ^~'^'^' 

done throughout the day, and I witnessed some beautiful 

practice." 

In a letter to the Secretary of the Xavy, December 29th, 
after the fleet had left and the transports had gone back to 
Hampton Roads, he writes: "At no time did I permit the ves- 
sels to open on them with all their batteries, limiting some of 
them to about two shots a minute, and permitting the large 
vessels to fight only one division of guns at a time; and 
the bombardment cost only a certain amount of shells, 
which I would expend in a month's target practice anyhow." ^'^i^-TO"^^'' 
Such are the salient features of the reports of Admiral Porter. 

Gen. Whiting, who was in the fort, and who commanded 
that militan' district, savs the slight damage done by this cannon- 

- . ' - ^ '^ ^ c.w. Ft.F.Ex.. 

admg was repaired at night, and that "the garrison was in no p- lo^, vol. 2. 
instance driven from its guns, the palisade was in perfect order, 
and the mines the same, the wires not having been cut.'' 

Gen. Weitzel testified before the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War: "I made a reconnoissance of the fort and saw 
that the work, as a defensive work, was not injured at all, except 
that one gun about midway of the land face was dismounted. c.v>".Ft.F.Ex., 
I did not see a single opening in the row of palisades that was 
in front of the ditch; it seemed to be perfectly intact." All in 
the fort agree that Admiral Porter was mistaken as to the 
effects of the cannonading. 

So much as to the condition of the fort. 

On the morning of the 25th all our transports anchored 



p- 



near the shore some two or three miles north of the fort, and 
the troops immediately began to land. 

I had been selected to storm the fort with my division. 

j\Iy report on December 28th is as follows: "Brevet Brig. 
Gen. Curtis and 500 of his brigade were the first to land, and 
were taken towards the fort by Gen. Weitzel for a reconnois- 
sance. * * * * It was dusk when I reached the front. I 

War Records, then heard that the First Brigade was to remain where it was 
part'i,'p/98i.' Until further orders, and that if any attack was made the respon- 
sibility would rest with the officer in immediate command. At 
this time I did not know that it had been decided not to attack 
the fort. Upon tlje report of Curtis that he could take the 
fort I sent his brigade forward to make the attempt." In his 
report Curtis says: "On my arrival at this point I received 
orders from Gen. Ames to return and re-establish my lines as 
they were, and, if possible, to occupy the fort, and I at once 

%art^i°p^983' Ordered my skirmishers forward, etc. '•' '■' '•' * The enemy, 
having cover of the darkness, opened on the skirmishers as 
they advanced with musketry and canister, but did not prevent 
their establishing the line in its former position, with the 

^,' T, ^00 reserves in close proximitv." Curtis made no further efifort to 

W . R. , p. 98.3. ^ 

vol. xLii. take the fort,, as I had ordered him to do, but sent word to me 
that he was "occupying his former position." Why he failed to 
assault the fort after I assvimed the responsibility and gave the 
order I have never known. At this time an order reached me 
to return to our ships, which we did, and the first expedition 
ended. 

An incident occurred which had much to do in giving an 
erroneous idea of the condition of the fort and garrison. 

One of our lieutenants approached the fort and captured 
its flag, which had been shot away by the Navy, and which had 
fallen with the flag staff on the outer slope of the parapet to the 
ditch. 

On this point Gen. Weitzel testifies: "I sent for Lieut. 
Walling and cjuestioned him about it, and he told me that a shell 

6 



had knocked tlie flagstaff outside and on top of the parapet, and 

the flag hung over into or outside of the ditch. Thinking that p. 77. " ' 

probably the rebels had not observed it, he crept up on his hands 

and knees to the palisading, found a hole in it that one of the 

shells had made, crept through the hole and up to the flag, and 

got it and got away with it without being observed." 

Let us see why our expedition terminated thus abruptly. 

Weitzel had been ordered by Butler to land and make a 
reconnoissance. Tn his testimony before the Comnnttee on the p. V2-3. ' "' 
Conduct of the War he gave his experience during the war in 
charging and defending field works, and continuing, said: 
"After that experience, with the information I had obtained from 
reading and study — for before this war I was an instructor at the 
r'Niilitarv iVcademv for three years under Professor ^Nlahan, on 
those very subjects — remembering well the remarks of the Lieu- 
tenant General commanding, that it was his intention I should 
command that expedition, because another officer selected by 
the war department had once shown timidity, and in face of the 
fact that I had been appointed a Major General only twenty 
days before, and needed confirmation; notwithstanding all this, 
I went back to Gen. Butler, and told him I considered it would 
be murder to order an attack on that work with that force." 

Col. Lamb says, in reference to the loss of his flag: "I had 
no fear of an assault, and because, during a l^ombardment which 
rendered an assault impossible, I covered my men, and a few ^Lamb!Taied 

1- 1 • ■ 1 . r , ,i i ^i i- J. J.1 Norfolk, Va.,1 

stragghng skn-mishers, too lew to attract attention, got near the jan. 20, i890. I 
fort, and some gallant officers thought they could have carried 
the work, it does not follow that they would not have paid dearly 
for their temerity if they had made the attempt." 

Gen. Whitina: sijeaks to the same effect. w.R. vol. xLn. 

* ' part 1, p. 993. 

Now, who is to say that Weitzel, Whiting and Lamb were 
mistaken as to the situation that day? Is it the brave soldier, 
who crept unseen through a hole in the palisade to the parapet 
and took a flag from a staff which had been shot away? 



Is it Admiral Porter, who wrote to the Secretary of the 

Navy Januar}^ 17th, 1865: "I have since visited Fort Fisher and 

the adjoininof works, and find their streng^th erreatly beyond what 
C.VV. Ft.F.Ex.. ^, , . , . . .,,,,.. ^, 

p. 190. I had conceived. An engineer might be excusable in saying they 

could not be captured except by regular siege. I w^onder, even 
now, how it was done. The work, as I said before, is really 
stronger than the MalakolT tower, which defied so long the com- 
bined power of France and England." In a letter of the i6th of 
[anuary to the Secretary of the Navv, he savs: "I was in Fort 

C.W. Ft.F.Ex.. ' ' ' ^ 

p. 184. xMalakofT a few days after it surrendered to the French and 

English; the combined armies of the two nations were many 
months capturing that stronghold, and it won't compare, either 
in size or strength, to Fort hlsher." 

I have no hesitancy in saying that they were not mistaken, 
though it is true that without personal knowledge of the charac- 
ter of the fort, and, for the time, believing Curtis, I ordered him 
to take it on his assertion that he could do so. 

What was not possible December 25th. was made possible 
January 15th, through an efficient bombardment on the part of 
the Navy and the co-operation of 2,000 sailors and marines and 
an additional force of 1,400 infantry. 

January ist, 1865, Grant wrote to Secretary Stanton: "The 
fact is, there are but two ways of taking Fort Fisher, operating 
from the water; one is to surprise them whilst there is but a small 
garrison defending the place ; the other is for the Navy to send a 
portion of their fieet into Cape Fear River." * ■'' * '■■' He 
xi.vi.'plri i continues: "In the three days of good weather which elapsed 
after the Army had reached the scene of action, before the Navy 
appeared, our troops had the chance of capturing Fort Fisher 
whilst it had an insufficient garrison to hold it. The delay gave 
the enemy time to accumulate a force. * * * '■' The failure 
before was the result of delays by the Navy." 

So, of Grant's two w^ays of taking the fort, one by surprise 
failed, as he said, because of the delay of the Navy, and as to the 
other. Col. Comstock reports to Grant, January 9th: "There is 

8 



p. 4. 



no hope, at least at present, of the Admiral's trying to run by ^xl%?i,' 'plr° k 
Fort Fisher." ^' 

Grant ordered and intended that Weitzel should have com- 
mand of the expedition. North Carolina was in Butler's mili- 
tary department. His order retained Weitzel as his subordinate. 

Though Grant may have intended and ordered certain action 
on the part of our expedition in December, 1864, on the first of 
January, 1865, he wrote the Secretary of War, as just quoted, that 
there were 1)ut two ways to take the fort — b}- surprise or by the 
occupancy of the river by the Navy. There was no surprise, the 
Navy was not in the river, the bombardment of the fort was 
ineffectual, Weitzel decided against an assault, Butler acquiesced 
and ordered the expedition back to Virginia, saying to Weitzel at 
the same time that he, Butler, would assume all responsibility, as 
he could stand the blame better than could Weit*!, the profes- 
sional soldier. 

The Committee on the Conduct of the War was composed 
of the leading men in Congress at that time. Aluch experience 
in the investigation of military affairs had made them, to say the 
least, fairly capable judges. They could command any witness, 
they were critical and severe in their examinations, and their con- 
clusions were reached without fear or favor. Flonest Ben Wade 
was their Chairman. This is their decision: 

"In conclusion, \our Conunittee would sav, from all the tes- 

C.W. Ft.F.Ex. 

timony before them, that the determination of Gen. Butler not to vol. n. p.^ 
assault the fort seems to have been fully justified by all facts and "^ 

circumstances then known or afterwards ascertained." 

Few can comprehend the penalty Gen. Butler had to pay for 
his action on this occasion. The war was within a few months of 
its end, and he had hoped for a share of the honors conferred on 
those who served faithfully and well, but he was sent home, 
and the whole nation condenmed him for tlie failure. Gen. 
Weitzel, one of the best of men, and one of our ablest generals, 
was humbled in spirit before the storm of censure and ridicule. 
But all that came after the capture of the fort on our second 
expedition. 

9 



PART II. 

The second expedition was started without delay. January 
2nd, 1865, Gen. A. H. Terry was put in command. On the 3rd 
we left camp, began re-embarkation on the 4th, and completed it 
on the 5th. 

I had 3,300 picked men in my division. Gen. Paine had the 
same number in his. There were added a brigade of 1,400 men 
under Col. J. G. Abbott and two batteries of light artillery of 
three and six guns each. Col. Comstock, who represented 
Grant on our first expedition, returned with us on the second. 

The transports put to sea on the morning of the 6th. A 
severe storm drove them into Beaufort. 

The troops were landed on the 13th, some two miles north 
of the fort. ^ 

Upon landing the first work on hand was to establish a line 
of breastworks from the ocean beach to the river to keep the 
enemy in the direction of Wilmington from interfering with our 
operations. 

w. R., vol. A reconnoissance was made. Terrv reports: "As a result of 

XLVI, part 1, . . ' ..-,., 

p. 397-8. this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme dimculty which 

might be expected in landing supplies and the materials for a 
siege on the often tempestuous beach, it was decided to attempt 
an assault the next day, provided that, in the mean time, the fire 
of the Navy should so far destroy the palisades as to make one 
practicable. This decision was communicated to Admiral Por- 
ter, who at once placed a division of his vessels in a position to 
accomplish this last-named object. It was arranged, in consul- 
tation with him, that a heavy bombardment from all the vessels 
should commence early in the morning and continue up to the 
moment of the assault, and that even then it should not cease, 
but should be diverted from the points of attack to the other 
parts of the work. It was decided that the assault should be 
made at 3 P. M., that the army should attack on the western half 
of the land face, and that a column of sailors and marines should 
assault the northeast bastion. The fire of the Navv continued 



during the night. At 8 A. M. of the 13th all of the vessels. 
except a division left to aid in the defense of our northern line, 
moved into position, and a fire, magnificent alike for its power 
and accuracy, was opened," and continued all day Saturday, Sat- 
urday night and Sunday, till 3.30 P. M. "Ames's division had 
been selected for the assault. " ■■' ■■'■ At 3.25 P. M. all the 
preparations were completed, the order to move forward was 
given to Ames, and a concerted signal was made to Admiral 
Porter to change the direction of his fire." 

The situation at this time was as follows: Some two miles 
north of the fort Gen. Paine had established a line of breastworks, 
ironi ocean to river, facing north, with his own division on the 
left and Col. Abbott's brigade on the right. On the sea beach, 
about half a mile from the fort, were 2,000 sailors and marines 
under command of Fleet Capt. K. R. Breese. On the east were 
64 ships of war, under Admiral Porter, cannonading the fort. 
My three brigades were in line, one behind the other, ranging 
trom three to five hundred yards from the fort. The left of each 
line nearly opposite the middle of the land face of the fort, the 
right near the river. A body of sharpshooters were pushed for- 
ward, and the whole division was covered from the fire of the 
enemy, as far as possible, by the inequalities of the ground and 
slight pits formed by throwing up the sand. 

Terry, Comstock and I were in a small advanced outwork 
about half a mile from the fort. My able and gallant Adjutant 
General, General Chas. A. Carleton. has made the following 
record: "Gen. Terry turned to Gen. Ames and said: 'Gen. 
Ames, the signal agreed upon for the assault has been given.' 
Gen. Ames asked: 'Have you any special orders to give?' Gen. 
Terry replied: 'No, you understand the situation and what is 
desired to be accomplished. I leave everything to yom* discre- 
tion.' " Thus was given me the unrestricted command of the 
fighting forces. 

At once I directed Capt. Lawrence of my staff to order Cur- 
tis, commanding the First Brigade, to charge, striking the para- 
pet at the end nearest the river. The palisade had been 



sufficiently broken and shot away by the fire of the Navy to 
permit the passage of the troops. As I approached the fort I 
watched with anxious eyes the charge of the First Brigade. 

^XLvi' "part \' Capt. Lawrence heroically led the charge of that part of the 

^'■^''' brigade which advanced at this time. He was the first through 

the palisade, and while reaching for a guidon to plant on the firs' 
traverse, his hand was shot away and he was dangerously 
wounded in the neck, but with this lodgment on the first traverse, 
the force of the charge was spent. I quickly ordered Col. Penny- 
packer's brigade, which was close at hand, to charge and sweep 
down the parapet to the ocean. 

I will not attempt a description of the battle. It was a 
charge of my brigades, one after the other, followed by 
desperate fighting at close c[uarters over the parapet and trav- 
erses and in and through the covered wa}'s. All the time we 
were exposed to the musketry and artillery of the enemy, while 
our own Xavy was thundering away, occasionally making us the 
victims of its fire. 

The official reports of my officers give no adequate idea of 
their gallant deeds, but they must supply the form and coloring 
of the warlike scenes of that eventful Sunday. 

Col. Daggett, in command of the First Brigade. January 
17th, reports: "At about 3 P. M., General Curtis having received 
orders to that effect from Cien. Ames, through Capt. Lawrence, 
the brigade advanced to the charge, so as to strike the sally-port, 
w. R.. vol. 1-hat having been deemed the only vulnerable point of the work; 
p.^418-9?^' ' and, after a desperate struggle, the advance of the brigade 
reached the parapet of the fort and scaled it to the first traverse, 
where the guidon of the 117th New York was planted — the first 
colors on the fort." 

Major O. P. Harding, who came out of the fight in command 
of the Second Brigade, reports: "The brigade was ordered to 
assault the fort, which was done in a gallant manner and under 
a heavy fire of grape and musketry, and entered the fort through 
a sally-port near the river. The 203rd Penns}lvam"a, commanded 

12 



by Col. J. W. Moore, was the first to enter the fort, closely fol- ^^xi.v?i'pln\' 

lowed by the 97tli Pennsylvania, coninianded by First Lieutenant p- -h^--"- 

John Wainwright. The colors of each of those regiments 

reached the parapet about the sani.e time, those of the 97th borne 

by Col. Pennypacker, and of the 203rd by Col. Moore. Col. 

Pennypacker was seriously wounded while planting- his colors on 

the third traverse, and Col. Moore fell dead while passing the 

second traverse, waving his colors and commanding his men to 

follow. After entering the fort the brigade became somewhat 

broken up; nevertheless, both officers and men behaved gallantly 

until its capture." 

"After the fall of Lieut. Col. Lyman, 203rd Pennsylvania, 
who fell on the sixth traverse, I commanded the regiment until 
about 5 P. M., when ordered by Gen. Ames to take command of 
the brigade, which I inmiediately organized." 

Capt. H. B. Essington, commanding 203rd Pennsylvania, 
reports: "The regiment charged on the right of the Second Bri- 
gade, and was the first regiment of the brigade to enter the fort, 
going in with the First (Curtis's) Brigade. After having assisted w. r., vol. 

, r 1 • r 1 ■ XLVi. part 1, 

ni capturmg the first two mounds, a portion of the regiment went p. 420. 
to the right and stationed themselves behind a bank in the open 
field south of the fort. The latter portion then charged across 
the plain, by order of the commanding general (Gen. Ames), until 
opposite the seventh or eighth traverse, where they threw up an 
embankment with their tin plates and shovels, which they held 
until the fort surrendered, keeping up a steady fire on the enemy." 

Let me say, in passing, that Col. Pennypacker's conduct in 
leading his brigade with the colors of his own regiment, placed 
him second to none for gallantry that day. It would be difficult 
to overestimate the value of his example to his brigade. 

Entering the fort and passing to the rear of the parapet at 
the west end, I made an examination of it from that position, 
and decided to use my diird brigade. Col. Bell's, with its left by 
the parapet, right extended south and west inside the fort, and 
charge into the angle formed by the land and sea faces. I 
ordered Bell forward with his brigade to report to me. Lieut. 

13 



w. R. . vol. Col. Johnson, conmianding the Third Brigade, January 19th, 
p.^Vi. ^'''" " reports: "CoL BeU was ordered by Gen. Ames to remain near 
him for the purpose of receiving orders." Unfortunately Col. 
Bell was killed in the advance, gallantly leading his brigade. 
The part of his brigade which reached me was in a somewhat 
disorganized condition. I formed it as best I could for the 
charge. Owing to the obstructions of the demolished quarters 
of the garrison and the fire of the enemy from the front (the angle 
had been partially filled in and was protected by a curtain), and 
from the right, as well as the fire of our Navy, the advance was 
checked. The men were in a very exposed position, and as no 
advantage could be gained there I ordered them to join the other 
troops in pushing seaward on the land face of the fort. Lieut. 
Col. Johnson further reports: "The brigade entered the fort 
conjointly with a portion of the First (Curtis's) Brigade, at the left 
Ijastion, a portion moving along the terre-plain and a portion on 
the ramparts, parapets and slopes, some of the officers and men 
m the advance with officers and men of other brigades, all wing 
with each other." 

Owing to the contracted space in which the fighting was 
done, brigade and regimental formations were impossible. What 
was accomplished was through the heroic efforts of small bodies 
of officers and men. 

From time to time I sent to Terry, who was in the earthwork 
half a mile away, reports of the progress I was making. 

I had previously learned that the sailors and marines who had 
made an attack on the sea angle had been quickly repulsed. 

As the sun sank to the horizon, the ardor of the assault 
abated. Our advance was but slow. Ten of my officers had 
been killed, 47 wounded, and about 500 men were killed and 
wounded. Among the killed was one brigade commander, the 
other two were wounded and disabled. I now requested Terr}^ 
to join me in the fort. It was dark before he and Comstock 
arrived. I explained the situation. 

Col. Abbott's brigade, which had been relieved from its 

14 



position in the line facing Wilmington, by the defeated sailors 
and marines, had been ordered to report to me. 

I decided to make my chief effort with the re-enforcements 
by moving the troops by the flank between the palisade and the 
foot of the fort until the head of the column should reach the 
northeast angle by the ocean, then face to the right and rush 
the men up and over the parapet; and at the same time continue 
the struggle for the traverses. Col. J. C. Abbott, commanding 
Second Brigade, ist division, in his report of January 15th, says: ^^ j^ ^.^j 
"Reaching the fort about dark I reported to Gen. Ames. By p.^4ia '''^'^^ ' 
order of Gen. Ames I first threw the 3rd New Hampshire Volun- 
teers, Capt. Trickey commanding, along the portion of the north 
face of the work already occupied by his troops and relieved 
them; also by Gen. Ames's order, I threw out the 7th Connecti- 
cut Volunteers, Capt. Marble commanding, as a picket in rear of 
the work, the right of the line resting on Cape Fear River. 
During this time the enemy occupied all the eastern and about 
one-third the northern face of the work. At about 9 o'clock, 
by order of Gen. Ames, I then proceeded to dislodge the 
enemy from the remainder of the fort. I then advanced the 
7th New Hampshire, Lieut. Col. Rollins commanding. They at 
once and gallantly charged up the slope enveloping the sea angle 
jf the work, meeting a sharp fire from the enemy, who w-ere 
stationed behind the parapets, and in rear of the main work." 

Capt. William H. Trickey, conuuanding 3rd New Hamp- 
shire Regiment, reports January i8th: "I was directed by Col. 
Abbott, commanding Brigade, to move my regiment to the 
extreme advance held by the second division and open fire upon 
the enemy; was thus engaged for nearly an hour, having, to a 
great extent, silenced the enemy's fire; was then directed by Col. 
Abbott to take and hold, with 20 men, the next traverse in front, 
the remainder of my command being left in several traverses to 
keep up the fire upon the enemy. We took the traverse, as w. r.. vol. 
directed, driving the enemy out. Thinking we could go farther, p. 4vi 
we charged and took the next two, with a like result. After tak- 
ing the third traverse, having met with considerable resistance, I 
did not deem it prudent to go farther with so few men, and 

15 



C.W. Ft.F. Ex. 
p. 190. 



opened a vigorous fire upon the enemy, who was rallymg for 
the recapture of the traverses; we held the enemy in check until 
the arrival of the 7th New Hampshire and 6th Connecticut, who 
charged and took the remainder of the work." 

Lieut. Col. Rollins reports: "At 10 P. j\I. moved my regi- 
ment inside the fort, and was ordered by Gen. Ames to take two 
w. R.. vol. traverses, and three, if possible, the number not then taken. I 

XLVi. part 1. 

P- -i^-^- moved over the third traverse of the fort, and advanced rapidlv 

inside the stockade until I reached the battery on the northeast 
angle of the fort, where I formed the right wing of the regiment, 
leaving the left in support. I then ordered a charge and cap- 
tured the three remaining traverses and batteries, then pushed on 
by the right flank, and by so doing cut ofi the angle of the fort, 
moved to the right, and, by a rapid and determined advance, cap- 
tured the remaining traverses and batteries of the fort proper.'' 

Thus, after some seven hours" fighting, more than five of 
which were after dark, the land face of the fort was occupied and 
all resistance ceased. The enemy fled to the shelter of Battery 
Huchanan, at the end of the po^'nt, two miles away. Terry took 
Abbott and a part of his brigade and marched to Battery 
W.K.. vol. Ikichanan. Abbott reports: 'T was met bv the Adjutant Gen- 

XLvi. part 1, 1 r , , 1 

p-11"- eral of the General commanding the enemy's forces, who ten- 

dered the surrender of the battery, upon which I referred to Gen. 
Ferry, who would soon arrive. '■' * * Gen. Terry having 
arrived, received the surrender of the work and the force." 

Col. Abbott was mistaken. Terry was too late. Capt. 
Lockwood of my staff had already received the surrender. 

It was after ten o'clock. The task set for us at half-past 
three was finished. Our work was done. 

The statement of their achievement is the highest eulogy that 
can be passed upon our soldiers. 

A grievous accident occurred early the next morning, which 

killed and wounded one hundred and thirty of our gallant heroes. 

it was the explosion of the magazine of the fort. A board of 

W.R., vol. enquiry was organized and found, "that the following are the 

p. 430. ' 16 



main facts, viz.: i, immediately after the capture of the fort, Gen. 
Ames gave orders to Lieut. Col. Samuel M. Zent to place guards 
on all the magazines and bomb-proofs. 2, Lieut. Col. Zent com- 
menced on the northwest corner of the fort, next the river, follow- 
ing the traverses round, and placed guards on thirty-one entrances 
under the traverses. The main magazine, which afterwards 
exploded, being in the rear of the traverses, escaped his notice, 
and, consequently, had no guards from his regiment or any 
other." 

Gen. Bragg reports that the defenders of the fort numbered, '^*'Bookl ^ou 
all told, about no commissioned of^cers and 2,500 men — their i^'- p- "^i. 
casualties being over 400. A few escaped across the river, in 
boats, under cover of the darkness; the rest became our prisoners. 

Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, had been visiting Sher- 
man at Savannah after his march through Georgia, and on his way 
north called at h^ort Fisher, where he had an interview^ with 
Terry. 

Upon Stanton's arrival at Fortress Monroe, Va., he sent a 
dispatch to President Lincoln marked "official,"' dated Tuesday, 10 
A. j\L, Jan. 17, 1865. In this dispatch Stanton mentions Terr\', 
my brigade commanders and some regimental commanders, but 
omits my name altogether. Among other things he says: "The 
assault on the other and most difficult side of the fort was made 
by a column of 3000 troops of the old loth corps, led by Col. 
Curtis, under the immediate supervision of Gen. Terry." 

This is not true, as the official reports show, in any other 
sense than that Curtis's brigade first reached the fort under my 
immediate orders with Terry half a mile away. An earlier attempt 
to make public these facts has been impracticable, as the volume 
of the war records covering this event was not published till 1894. 

With this as a preface I will add to the extracts of the 
reports of some of my subordinate officers already given, the 
report of Gen. Terry, who was my only superior officer. He 
says: "Of Gen. Ames I have alreadv spoken in a letter w.r.. vol. 

1- 1 . . TT 1 1 11 1 XLvr, part 1, 

recommendmg his promotion. He commanded all the troops p. 399. 
engaged and was constantly under fire. His great coolness. 



good judgment and skill were never more conspicuous than in 
this assault." 

These official reports show, as Terry says, that I "commanded 

w. R., vol. all the troops engaged" from the first act, when my aide, Capt. A. 

p. 417. ^'^^ ' G. Lawrence, led the first brigade into the fort, to the last act. 

Avhen the garrison surrendered to my aide, Capt. H. C. 

Lockwood. 

The sailors and marines who assaulted in column the north- 
east angle of the fort along the sea beach, were a body of 2,000 
men, made up of detachments from different ships. Naturally 
enough, Capt. Breese found it, as has been .stated, an unwieldy 
mass. The 1,600 sailors were armed onlv with pistols and cut- 
lasses. They were quickly repulsed. Few reached the parapet. 
Once checked, they turned and fled, losing 300 in killed and 
p. 103.*^' ''^' wounded. Admiral Porter testified: "I suppose the whole thing 
was over in fifteen minutes, as far as the sailors were concerned, 
for they were cut down like sheep." 

Later, this force was sent to the line of entrenchments facing 
Wilmington, relieving Col. Abbott's brigade, which reported to 
me. Of course iVdmiral Porter expected his sailors to carry the 
fort, but, alas! he had been deceived as to its defensive capabilities, 
which deception resulted in the apparently needless sacrifice of his 
gallant sailors. 

Our Navy, in its ships and armament, was the most powerful 
that ever existed up to that time. In officers and men it never 
had its equal, and never will till an equally enlightened, powerful 
».nd liberty-loving people again rise, in their might, in a struggle 
for self-preservation. 

As to the effect on the fort of the second bombardment, CoL 
Lamb writes: "The land armament, with palisades and torpe- 
does, had been destroyed. For the first time in the history of 
Century War sicgcs the land defences of the works were destroyed, not by the 
act of the besieging army, but by the concentrated fire, direct and 
enfilading, of an immense fleet, poured upon them without inter- 
mission, until torpedo wires were cut, palisades breached so that 

18 



Books, p. 65-1. 



they actually afforded cover for assailants, and the slopes of the 
work were rendered practicable for assault." 

Why the first expedition was a failure and the second a suc- 
cess has never been rightly understood. The military situations 
have been obscured by the, contention between Gen. Butler and 
Admiral Porter, though the most amicable relations existed 
between the army and navy. 

It has been believed that the fort was in the same condition 
•on both occasions, and that it was but poorly garrisoned on the 
first. Those who so held were in error in both particulars. 

According to Badeau, Grant's historian: "Curtis declared 
that the fort could have been carried on the first expedition, and 
that at the moment when they were recalled they virtually had 
possession." This declaration has been accepted as the truth. 

We can examine the facts, now that the official reports have 
been published, and form our own opinions on this point, which 
has been the pivot of the whole controversy. 

It appears from Curtis's report that he had "pushed the right 
of his skirmishers to within 75 paces of the fort and had sent 
back to his reserves for 200 men with which to possess the fort, 
but his messenger was there informed that orders from the 
department commander bade him retire," which he did. 

Let us see what these 200 men would have had to do to make 
what Curtis calls a "virtual," an actual possession of the fort. 

Col. Lamb had a force of 1,400 men, 900 of whom were vet- 
erans. Whiting, Lamb and other officers commend the disci- 
pline, skill and gallantry of the garrison. I will not take time to 
quote from their reports. They all show that the officers of the 
fort were keenly alive to our movements. Col. Lamb states that 
he intentionally kept his men hidden from view. He was per- 
fectly familiar with the surroundings, both within and without the 
fort. 

Now, the one question to decide is, could those 200 men, 
sent for by Curtis, have taken possession of that palisaded Mala- 
koff fortress, with its garrison of 1,400 men? 

19 



Badean's His- 
tory of U. S. 
Grant, vol. 
m, p. 316. 



W. R. , vol. 
xLii. part 1, 
p. 983. 



Century W :i r 
Books. 



Badeau's His- 
tory of U. S. 
Grant, Vol. 
III. p. 342. 



Lieut. Col. Barney, who commanded our forces behind the 
l)icket hne, nowhere intimates that we had any kind of possession 
of the fort. 

Even Curtis reports, officially, that his skirmishers were met 
with musketry and canister, and that he retired under a heavy fire. 

In making a decision. Lamb's report must not be over- 
looked. He reports: "That it was dark at 5.30, when the fleet 
ceased firing. No assault could be made while the fleet was fir- 
ing. When the firing ceased the parapets (which were 20 feet 
high) were at once manned and half of the garrison (700 men) 
were stationed outside the work behind the palisade, which was 
9 feet high and pierced for musketry." What soldier will say 
vve had "virtual" possession of the fort under such circumstances? 

The second expedition took this question from the realm of 
speculation. 

Three weeks after the first attempt we were back again 
before the fort, which, because of the efficient bombardment of 
the Navy, was far less capable of resistance. A column of 2,000 
sailors and marines were to make a gallant assault on the sea 
angle simultaneously with ours, thereby to create a diversion, 
greatly to our advantage. 

Curtis had in his brigade, now forming the first line, more 
than twice as many men as he had before the fort on the first 
expedition. Again I gave him the order to take the fort. Did 
he take it? No. His brigade, led by Capt. Lawrence, made a 
lodgment on one corner of it — a lodgment so tmcertain that I 
immediately ordered up Col. Pennypacker's brigade, which, 
inspired and led by him and Col. Moore, reached the third 
traverse and made our foothold secure. Such are the official 
records of the battle. 

I wish to touch one other point. Badeau writes in this same 
history: "The fighting was continued from traverse to traverse, 
until at 9 o'clock the troops had nearly reached the bastion. Bell 
had been killed and Pennypacker wounded,. and Curtis now sent 
back for re-enforcements. The advance party was in innninent 
peril, for the guns from both bastions and the mound batteries 



were turned upon them. At this crisis a staff officer brouglit 
orders from Terry to stop fighting and begin intrenching. Cur- 
tis was inflamed wdth the magnificent rage of battle, and fairly 
roared at this command, 'Then we shall lose whatever we have 
gained. The enemy will drive us from here in the morning.' 
While he spoke he was struck by a shell, and fell senseless to the 
earth. The hero of Fort Fisher had fallen, and the fort was not 
yet carried. Ames, who was near him, sent an officer to Terry to 
report that Curtis was killed, and that his dying request was that 
the fighting might go on. It was also Ames's opinion that the 
battle should proceed. Terry caught the contagion, and deter- 
mined to continue the assault, even if it bcame necessary to 
abandon the line of defence towards Wilmington. Abbott's 
re-enforcements were at once ordered forward, and as they entered 
the -fort the rebels on the bastion gave way and Fort Fisher was 
carried." It is due to Badeau to state that he says in a note that 
he "obtained the account of this assault from a paper written by 
an aide-de-camp to Gen. Curtis." 

This remarkable statement deserves a moment's consideration. 
If it be true, then all the chief honors must fall on one head. But 
it is not true. If Terry gave orders to stop fighting and begin 
intrenching, who can believe that it was through the "contagion 
caught" by him from Curtis that the fight continued, or that he 
would "abandon the line towards Wilmington" to try uncertainties 
at the fort? 

Terry reports: "When Bell's brigade was ordered into action w. r.voi. xlvi 
I foresaw that more troops would probably be needed, and sent 
an order for Abbott's brigade to move down from the north line, 
at the same time requesting Captain Breese to replace them with 
his sailors and marines. I also directed General Paine to send 
me one of the strongest regiments of his own division; these 
troops arrived at dusk and reported to General Ames." 

This treatment of Terry and the ignoring of division, brigade 
and regimental commanders find no justification in the facts. 
Terry is entitled to every honor due his position. Pennypacker 
and Bell can not be swept aside so lightly, nor the regimental 
commanders, whose names I need not give here. 



p. 399. 



I would say specifically to that reference to myself, that I 
did not send any request, "dying" or other, from Curtis toTerry 
that the fighting might go on. 

If Terry intended my division to stop fighting and begin 
intrenching he did not send the order to Curtis, one of my 
brigade commanders, nor would Terry send re-enforcements to 
Curtis over my head. 

According to this aide, Curtis was wounded at 9 o'clock 
while criticizing Terry's order to stop fighting and begin intrench- 
ing. I say in my report that Curtis was wounded "a short time 
before dark" on that brief winter's day. 

I saw him in and emerge from a covered way at the west 
end of the parapet. He approached me and began to speak; 
almost at the same time a shot struck him down. Col. Daggett, 
who succeeded to the command of Curtis's brigade, reports two 
days after: Curtis was seriously wounded about 4.30. Gen. 
Carleton, who was with me at the time, and picked up his sword 
as he fell, says Curtis was shot at about 4.30. 

And yet Badeau would have us believe that Curtis was 
wounded while criticizing Terry's order to stop fighting and begin 
intrenching, at 9 o'clock, some four hours after Curtis fell sense- 
less at my feet. 

In fact, he was wounded before dark, about an hour and a 
half after the battle began, and some four hours before the fort 
was taken. The exact minute is of no importance. Participants 
in a battle are poor judges of passing time. 

In this instance it is fixed accurately enough in the official 
reports of Daggett, Abbott and myself, as well as Carleton's state- 
ment of his recollections. 
^^partY p^4W Gen. Terry says in his of^cial report of the battle : "Brigadier 

General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker. Bell and Abbott, the 
brigade commanders, led them with the utmost gallantry. Cur- 
tis was wounded after fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand; 
Pennypacker while carrying the standard of one of his regiments, 
the first man in a charge over a traverse; Bell was mortally 
wounded near the palisade.'' 



22 



This is all, literally all, Terry says of exceptional services by 
Curtis. "Fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand" is most com- 
mendable under the circumstances, but it does not in itself justify 
claims for exceptional honors. 

"Sly report says: "The conduct of the officers and men of ^xLvi.'part i^ 
this division was most gallant. * * * Where the name of ^- '^'^■ 
everv officer and man engaged in this desperate conflict should 
be submitted, I shall at present only be able to give a few of those 
most conspicuous. It is hoped all may be properly rewarded. 

"Brevet Brig. Gen. N. M. Curtis, conuuanding First Brigade, 
Avas prominent throughout the day for his bravery, coolness and 
judgment. His services can not be overestimated. He fell a 
short time before dark, seriously wounded in the head by a 
canister shot. 

"Col. Pennypacker, commanding the Second Brigade, was 
seriously wounded while planting his colors on the third traverse 
of the work. This officer was surpassed by none, and his 
absence during the , day was most deeply felt and seriously 
regretted. 

"Col. L. Bell, coir.manding Third Brigade, was mortally 
woimded while crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. 
He was an able and efficient officer; one not easily replaced. 

"Col. J. W. Moore, 203d Pennsylvania A'olunteers, behaved 
with the most distinguished gallantry. He was killed while 
passing the second traverse of the fort, in advance of his regi- 
ment, waving his colors. Few equalled, none surpassed this 
brave officer." 

My report on Curtis is not less generous than Terry's; but it 
was not intended to, and I doubt if it does, sustain his pretensions 
of this day. 

The official records, written thirty-two years ago, must be 
the foundation for all claims of honor and distinction. Nothing 
can now be added to them or taken from them. By them we all 
nntst be judged. 

Misrepresentations greatly injured General Butler, and deeply 

23 



humiliated Gen. Weitzel. Truth has been outraged — truth over- 
slow in the pursuit of falsehood, not always the most agreeable 
company. 

In this paper I have attempted to right a wrong. I have 
given few opinions of my own. I have called up the actors them- 
selves, and have let them speak in their own v.-ords — sometimes 
under oath — always under a sense of grave responsibility. 



AUTHORITIES. 



Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Vol. II, Fort Fisher Expe- 
dition. War of the Rebellion Records, Vol. XLII, part I. War Records, Vol. 
XLVI, part i. War Records, Vol. XLVI, part 2. The Century Company's War 
Books, Vol. IV. Letter of Col. Wm. Lamb, dated Norfolk, Va. 



24 



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54 4 . 



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